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Abstract 
In this paper I perform a discourse analysis of the academic literature on the Green Revolution in East 
Africa, governed by two questions: what form or shape is given to agency in each GR study? And, which 
agencies are considered prime movers that play leading roles in the narratives and which others are 
relegated to subsidiary roles? A wide variety of figurations of agency are mapped, including socio-
ecological events that are Malthusian or critical, heroic individuals, technology and its users, as well as 
relational entanglements between social, ecological and technical entities. Yet, the analysis reveals that 
the process of adjustment and adaptation between different social, ecological and technical entities, in 
practice, on farmers’ fields and beyond, is largely unarticulated in the GR discourse. Central among 
prime mover figurations are national governments, donors, scientists, market-based approaches and 
agricultural intensification technologies. I argue that such figurations help legitimate government and 
donor driven GR efforts in the last decade and a half, which are delivered largely through market 
mechanisms. Subsuming heterogeneous entities into unified groups such as East African smallholders, 
or Sub-Saharan African soils, some studies may depict their actions as homogeneous. Such 
homogenisation masks relations of power within groups and obscures the ontological multiplicity of 
things. Homogenising depictions of (inefficient) smallholders and (depleted) soils may also help 
steamroll the use of standardised modern technologies such as inorganic fertilizers.  
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1. Introduction 
In the last few decades, a number of attempts have been made to get a Green Revolution (GR) off the 
ground in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Most of these attempts are viewed as unsuccessful, particularly in 
comparison with Asian successes in rice and wheat yields (Djurfeldt et al. 2005). Yet hopes for a new GR 
in SSA continue to be alive. Several strong commitments to an African GR have been made during the 
last decade. Perhaps the most prominent among them is the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa 
(AGRA), supported by the Gates and Rockefeller Foundations (Toeniessen et al. 2008). Annual African 
GR Forums are now attended by representatives of many African Governments and by international 
firms. The East African region, and especially Kenya, has been at the centre of this renewed thrust for a 
GR (Odame and Muange 2011). 
The new proponents of an African GR call for harnessing the 'best' science and technology for 
agricultural innovation (e.g. Pingali 2012). They also promote the building of better market 
infrastructures for poverty reduction. Critics, on the other hand, argue that such a techno-fix and 
marketisation-based approach ends up disregarding and marginalising more viable African agricultural 
alternatives (e.g. Holt-Giménez 2008). Rather than rehearsing this debate in the present paper, I focus 
on the different figurations given to agency and power in published academic studies on the GR in East 
Africa (focussing particularly on Kenya). To map the figurations, I ask what 'flesh and features' are given 
to agency defined as the capacity to act (Latour 2005: 53). In doing this, I follow the studies closely and 
make no prior assumptions about who/what can act. Actors can be (individual) humans, nonhumans, 
or any relational combination between them. To map power, following Stirling (2014), I ask how 
asymmetrically structured is agency in a GR study, which actors are considered prime movers, and which 
others are relegated to subsidiary roles working for or against the prime movers?  
Mapping these configurations of agency and power in GR framings is important for three reasons. First, 
it allows one to document a range of agencies that are considered instrumental for achieving a GR in 
the academic discourse. Figurations of successful agency and prime-mover power, afforded to some 
entities, may be used as justifications for promoting and sustaining them. Conversely, figurations of 
detrimental or failed agency, presented in the form of critique, may be used to create space for 
alternatives. Second, mapping figurations allows one to distinguish between agencies cast as individuals 
(e.g., a farmer, an organisation) and as relationally constituted. For relational agencies, what constraints 
and affordances are identified as important for success or failure? And what constraints and affordances 
are identified: are these restricted to humans (social relations) or are things (ecological and technical 
entanglements) also brought into the picture? Third, mapping these figurations allows comparative 
analyses between different framings of prime movers and subsidiaries, as well as of relations that are 
social, ecological and/or technical.  
In order to select the academic studies on the East African GR, I relied on Scopus. I selected all studies 
listed in Scopus by searching for 'green revolution' in combination with 'East Africa'. To this selection, I 
added the studies revealed by searching for 'green revolution' with Kenya. This yielded a total of 25 
studies in the GR-East Africa-Kenya selection. Barring two studies, one each from 1975 and 1984, all 
were published in the last 15 years (since 2003). One of the 25 studies is in the German and, due to my 
linguistic limitations, had to be excluded from the analysis. Thus, for the discourse analysis, I address 
my questions on figurations of agency and power to each of the remaining 24 studies. A small subset of 
these studies is generally critical of the technology-driven intensification implied by conventional GR 
initiatives, particularly when it comes to sustainability (e.g. Tully et al. 2016; Wood et al. 2015; Brooks 
2014; Thompson and Scoones 2011; Goldberger 2008). These studies thus allow me to map figurations 
of detrimental agency associated with GR technologies or interventions. Yet, a bulk of the mapping of 
figurations of agency and power is from studies that are not generally critical of the GR and therefore 
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prone to associating successful effects with technologies and GR-promoting institutions (as well as 
markets).  
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2. Conceptual Anchors 
Following Latour (2005: 71) and Giddens (1984: 14), agency may be treated as the capacity to act, by 
'making a difference' on/to 'a state of affairs. Here, making a difference does not stand for ex nihilo 
production (of decisions and outcomes). Neither can it be reduced to a cause to effect linearity. It 
includes the making of various non-deterministic and non-linear effects.  
I examine what figurations are given to agency in a GR narrative. In other words, what 'flesh and 
features' are ascribed to agents so as to 'make them have some form or shape' (Latour 2005: 53). This 
form or shape in conventional figurations may be individual humans and collective groups (or networks), 
women and men, farmers and workers, firms and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), scientists 
and governments. Figurations of agency may also be one or more nonhumans such as insects, plants, 
technologies, policies, plans, economic indicators and models. Many of these nonhumans are developed 
and deployed by humans, and may not be separable from their human developers and users in the real 
world. In this paper, my focus is on representations of humans and nonhumans as doing things and 
producing specific effects. I map the depictions of humans and nonhumans, in GR narratives, as making 
a difference to a state of affairs.  
Additionally, figurations of agency could include social structures such as (traditional) norms and 
(informal) rules that shape human actions and interactions. According to such depictions, structures 
have the capacity to make a difference to human states of affairs. Structures are thus given agency. 
Structures could also be depicted as processes, as structuration in which rules and resources are 
(gradually) transformed (Giddens 1984: 25). Figurations of agency as processes may go beyond 
structures, to include processes the diffusion of a technology, the implementation of a policy, the 
growth of a plant, or the marketing of a crop.  
In addition to mapping who or what is given the capacity to act, in the selected GR narratives, I also map 
how the effects of this agency are represented. Effects may be situated anywhere on the gradient 
between an immensely positive achievement to callous neglect and disastrous failure.  
Empirically, states of affairs may be framed in accordance with particular missions or objectives, at 
different scales and in different contexts. Examples of missions include project implementation, 
agricultural input delivery, climate adaptation, or sustainable development, in which one or more actors 
(e.g., farmers and bank managers) make a difference (e.g., through technology adoption or credit 
provision). In general, figurations of agency to people or things are made possible by the active or 
passive presence of others. These others constitute states of affair which are acted upon.  
The second question that animates the discourse analysis is related to power as asymmetrically 
structured agency (Stirling 2014). I map the framings of power in discourse. These framings are 
important to study not only to appreciate how power is written into academic discourse,1 but also 
because they are performative. In various non-linear and uncertain ways, framings move beyond the 
page and contribute to transforming people’s social practices and subjectivities (Callon 2007), by 
becoming embedded in policies, strategies, projects and other interventions.  
                                                          
1 The relation between power and discourse has been central to much Foucauldian discourse analysis (see e.g. Hajer and 
Versteeg 2005; Dryzek 2013). Discourse analysts have focussed on contestation between competing discourses deployed and 
mobilised by different actors, power exerted by an authoritative or dominant discourse, and disempowering effects that may 
be produced by discourses. My aim in this paper is somewhat more specific. Rather than focusing on discourses as wholes, I 
try to capture the implications of discourses for power, by focusing on how they represent agency and power in the GR 
narratives. 
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To map depictions of power, I explore how a narrative accounts for difference between members of a 
collective entity in society (e.g. a class, a tribe) and nature (e.g. trees, soils). When difference within a 
collective is not account for, the essentialised group may be understood through the lens of a 
representative agent. And when difference is accounted for, I attempt to map how any within-group 
asymmetries and hierarchies are represented. 
I also map which agencies, individual or collective, structural or processual, have the status of prime 
movers in a text conferred on them. A prime mover is the leading agency populating a narrative. It has 
a transformative effect on a focal state of affair. It may even transform multiple states of affair. Picking 
its prime movers, and often treating them as autonomous, a text may use them as points of reference. 
A prime mover is then presented as an inevitable force: others must act in reaction to it. These others’ 
agency is thus made subsidiary to the prime mover. They react to the prime mover, but do not respond 
to any of their other social, economic or environmental concerns. Or they may subsume these other 
concerns in their reaction to the prime mover. This reactive agency of subsidiaries may either be 
presented as working for the prime mover, as an assistant in influencing a state of affairs, or it may be 
presented as working against the prime mover, resisting or rejecting it, dialectically. When a subsidiary 
agency is a collective entity such as a tribe or a social group, I also map how narratives account for 
difference within them, as noted earlier.  
The concepts outlined above, of agency and power, may be used to map any depiction of action. In the 
East African GR narratives, I aim to capture which entities are given the agency and power to act. In 
performing the discourse analysis, however, I do not focus on the agency of the authors of the 
narratives. I do not map how the GR narratives articulate the agency of their own authors. And I do not 
focus on the motivations that drive authors and future 'owners' of discourses. Clearly the interests and 
preferences of the authors and owners may be reflected in the content and deployment of discourses. 
But I do not trace these interests and preferences. Nor do I attempt to map the processes through which 
they may enter the discourses. I am only interested in mapping what is said in the texts, who does what 
and whose agency is conferred the status of a prime mover? After carrying out this mapping, I discuss 
the implications of these configurations of agency and power depicted in the academic discourse on a 
GR in East Africa. 
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3. Figurations of Agency and Power 
In the East African and Kenyan literature on the Green Revolution, I encountered a wide range of 
figurations of agency. Contrary to much social theory that considers agency to be an attribute of humans 
only, (individualised) nonhumans were routinely given agency in the narratives. Among these 
nonhuman entities are technologies as well as forces of nature.  
Figurations of agency may often be individualising, centred on a unitary human or nonhuman who may 
be given the credit for or the burden of acting. Such depictions marginalise the individualised entity’s 
relations that afford and constrain action, as well as structural forces that condition individual action 
(Giddens 1984; Latour 2005).  Individualising narratives may sometimes account for multiple agencies 
that act side by side. In such narratives, agency to influence a particular state of affairs is thus pluralised. 
Depictions of pluralised agency may make explicit how different human and/or nonhuman actors work 
alongside each other. The latter depictions of agency are relational. In these depictions, action is 
presented as distributed across many interconnected entities that participate in influencing a state of 
affairs, mediating each other’s influence. Interconnected entities may either afford or constrain each 
other’s actions. In relational figurations of individual agency, it may be made explicit how an individual’s 
agency is afforded or constrained by her relations with human and nonhuman entities. In this way, the 
collective behind the individual is brought to light (Callon and Law 1997). 
Below, I begin with some figurations of agency ascribed to socio-ecological events and processes such 
as population growth and rainfall patterns, classifying them as Malthusian and Critical agencies. This is 
followed by a discussion of individualising figurations of agency. In addition to heroic scientists and 
governments, these include modern technologies and some economic models and indicators. Finally, I 
discuss figurations of relational agency. 
3.1. Socio-Ecological Events: Malthusian and Critical Agencies 
Of the processes that are given agency in the GR narratives, particularly interesting are figurations of 
what I call Malthusian agencies. These focus on versions of rapid population growth which is given the 
agency of creating widespread hunger, afforded by stagnant grain yields and cultivation area (Kijima et 
al. 2006; Otsuka and Yamano 2006). The same rapidly growing population also presented as producer 
of socio-economic changes such as land disputes and fragmentation, and erosion of 'customary' land 
laws (Fleming 1975). These changes are presented as if the latter laws have never had to deal with 
changes in population levels in their history. 'High human population growth rates' may also further 
complicate the challenges of food insecurity and poverty in Africa 'resulting from poor crop yields' (Khan 
et al. 2014: 334). 
In the form of assumptions that growth of rural population produces scarcity of 'better' land (Belshaw 
1984), which pushes people into urban areas (Otsuka and Yamano 2006), Malthusian agencies may also 
be embedded into policies and models for planning the future of agrarian and structural change. 
Figurations of Malthusian agencies may also be used to create space for proposing alternatives, to 
address the damage they are depicted as causing. Consider the agency ascribed to 'decreasing land per 
capita', resulting from population growth, which leads to the 'adoption of improved varieties by 
smallholder pigeonpea farmers [that] is key to increasing their output and incomes' (Simtowe and 
Muange 2013: 164).  
What I refer to as Malthusian agencies are, in general, manifest as crises arising out of population 
growth, which produce large-scale socio-economic effects. Milder and smaller crises may also be 
presented in the form of a critique of extant situations. This critique may be based on ascription of 
negative agency, of producing discontent and failure, to some entities and processes. The negative 
effects are made explicit in order to create space for the promotion of a narrative’s preferred 
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alternatives. The role of these critical agencies in narratives is clearly highlighted by Goldberger (2008). 
She argues that in Kenya: 
Organic agriculture NGOs emerged because of widespread discontent with the research 
orientation, technology dissemination practices, and social/environmental externalities 
associated with the green revolution. Stories about the 'failure' of the green revolution regime 
– part of the larger critique or 'deconstruction' of formal agricultural technoscience – created 
space for new institutions (NGOs), new agricultural ideas (e.g., organic farming), new research 
methods (e.g., participatory approaches), and new information dissemination strategies (e.g., 
farmer-to-farmer training). 
Goldberger 2008:277 
Here, according to Goldberger, the critique of the GR assumes the agency of opening up actual space 
for the promotion of non-intensive agricultural methods.  
'Conventional forms of development interventions', often donor-funded, are depicted as creators of 
'accountability challenges because of their propensity to create power imbalances, competition among 
local development partners, and a mind-set of dependency and marginality among beneficiaries' 
(Ndiame et al. 2016: 201). Here the authors construct a supposedly unified and homogenous category, 
'conventional forms of development interventions', to launch a critique. The critique serves to create 
space for the authors' own favoured intervention of the Farmer Organization Support Center for Africa 
(FOSCA). In the latter half of the authors’ narrative, FOSCA is the prime mover. It empowers farmers, 
stimulates linkages between farmers and extension services and furthers collaborative relationships 
(Ndiame et al. 2016). 
Critique may also be directed toward an extant non-GR situation to promote intensive agriculture. For 
example, the agricultural sector in Africa is criticised for its 'poor performance' and is predicted to lead 
to an increase its food imports in the future (Toeniessen et al. 2008: 234). African agriculture, not yet 
'an engine of economic growth', is criticised for the lack of poverty reduction that can be achieved 
through urbanisation (ibid.). This critique lays the foundation for the furthering of some agencies such 
as 'African Governments, the international community, and the private sector to reverse trends by 
stimulating gains in agricultural productivity' (ibid.). Similarly, the public sector-based distribution of 
food, and development of agricultural technologies, in Kenya may be considered a failure, in order to 
create the space for market reform to further 'the push for liberalisation of the cereal input sector' 
(Odame and Muange 2011: 79). In pushing this liberalisation, agency of the critique joins forces with 
that of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, with their structural adjustment programs 
(Odame and Muange 2011). 
3.2. Individualising Agencies 
Included among nonhuman figurations of agency are some economic indicators and models (of change). 
These models and indicators present a socio-political and socio-ecological situation or process in 
narrowly economic terms. In this way, on the page, they economise a complex reality of diverse 
socioeconomic relations that underpin economic production and exchange. Examples of such 
economising agencies include the poverty line that represents poverty in terms of a number, such as 
$1.25/day/person (PPP). This figure individualises people, isolating them from their socio-ecological 
relations, in order to then perform comparisons between them. Individualised persons, households or 
villages below poverty line then become targets of development interventions, to improve livelihoods 
and practices.  
Other economising agencies such as agricultural productivity growth may be argued to reduce poverty, 
often mediated by the 'model of structural transformation; (Jayne et al. 2003: 255). Here productivity 
growth may be measured for an individualised farm, village, region or country. In order to achieve this 
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productivity growth, development interventions are designed to transform impoverished smallholder 
agricultural realities (Toeniessen et al. 2008). Yet other economising agencies include the concept of 
'market failure' (and missing markets) due to which productivity growth and technology uptake are 
argued to be low (Toeniessen et al. 2008: 238). Similarly, (high) transaction costs and asymmetric 
information may be given the agency of slowing down the delivery of results from public-private 
partnerships (Scoones and Thompson 2011: 6). Interestingly, legal entities not directly associated with 
economics, such as 'trade and licensing arrangements and restrictive domestic laws in the seed 
industry', may be presented as economising agencies by producing 'inadequate competition and high 
input prices' (Odame and Muange 2011: 79). Even agriculture as a whole may be given the economising 
agency of influencing 'national economies through forward and backward linkages' (Toeniessen et al. 
2008: 233). 2  And 'the [homogenised] Asian experience', mapped using long-term panel data on 
agricultural incomes and data on nonfarm labour markets, given the agency to strongly suggest that an 
African GR must be realised to increase 'the ability to participate in nonfarm activities in Sub-Saharan 
Africa' (Otsuka and Yamano 2006: 397). 
Agency is ascribed to statistical models and correlations, which indicate that most smallholders have 
'limited potential to break out of poverty through high-return off-farm activities' (Jayne et al. 2003: 260). 
This indication then becomes performative, by making the policy case for 'improving access to land 
among the most land-constrained smallholder households' to reduce poverty (Jayne et al. 2003: 271).  
The performative power of claims associated with (numerical) indicators and models may depend on 
the assumption that they represent reality adequately and accurately (Callon 2007). Numbers (and 
statistical correlations, revealed by models) thus may be equated to actual realities of development and 
underdevelopment of agriculture, through claims such as 'organic agriculture is severely 
underdeveloped in Africa' as 'certified organically managed farms – approximately 119,140 farms on 
1,025,898 ha – represent a mere 0.2% of the continent’s total agricultural' (Goldberger 2008: 275-276). 
In this depiction, numerical data are believed to adequately capture the underdeveloped reality of 
organic agriculture in Africa. No issues with missing data, their incomplete coverage, the models' partial 
representation of a complex reality, their uncertainties and ambiguities, are revealed or discussed. 
Generalised figures such as this may also mask important 'variations through time and space' (Scoones 
and Thompson 2011: 2).  
3.2.1. Heroic Individuals 
Figurations of individualising agency can be GR heroes (Sumberg et al. 2012), especially when it comes 
to scientists such as Norman Borlaug, often referred to as the father of the GR. Borlaug may be isolated 
from his own colleagues and celebrated as an individual scientist who 'transformed the breeding of 
wheat' and thereby playing a central role in averting 'the Malthusian tragedy (Pollock 2008). If relational 
constraints, such as the lack of availability of equipment and trained colleagues on Borlaug’s agency, 
are identified they appear to place emphasis on Borlaug's heroism in overcoming all obstacles placed in 
his way. Borlaug is accorded the role of a prime mover in the narrative. 
Other scientists figure as ushering in new technologies such as 'large-scale molecular genomics' that 
provide access to 'previously inaccessible sources of genetic variation' (Philippe et al. 2009: 539). The 
latter 'could be exploited in breeding programmes'. Researchers’ heroic agency may not be confined to 
the breeding laboratories and programmes, but rather extend to their actions in exposing individual 
farmers to new technologies (Simtowe and Muange 2013: 162). 
                                                          
2 Acknowledging the economising agency of agriculture through its linkages, investments by donors such as The Rockefeller 
Foundation promote agricultural intensification for poverty reduction and multi-sectoral economic growth in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (Toeniessen et al. 2008). Economising agencies are thus embedded in donor strategies and end up producing divergent 
effects on farmers' lives and lands. 
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Figurations of individualising agency to produce significant farm-based effects may be given to outputs 
of scientists' discovery and development processes. For example, improved varieties (of Sorghum in 
Ethiopia) developed by scientists are depicted as 'widening the genetic base' on farms (Mekbib 2008: 
355). Fertilizers are given the sole credit of quickly reversing 'decades of soil nutrient depletion and have 
a quick impact' (Nziguheba et al. 2010: 105). Technologies with proper names such as Sonalika and Siete 
Cerros, semi-dwarf varieties of wheat that are made resistant to stem rust, are given the agency of 
forming 'the backbone of the green revolution; (Hodson 2011: 95). Generally, in these figurations, the 
role of farmers in adapting and adjusting the technologies to work on the farm is marginalised. 
Heroic agency may also be ascribed to individualised ecological entities. For example, Philippe et al. 
(2009: 538) attribute to trees (undifferentiated) the agency of being the 'best protectors of soil fertility' 
(Philippe et al. 2009: 538). This recognition of trees' agency is then used to justify a call for 'shaded 
cultivation' of coffee, and conditions for reforestation are argued to exist in all relevant countries. 
Generalising positive agency to nonhuman entities, especially as they are individualised, may thus be 
performed to promote the further deployment of the entities, often through their commodification. 
3.2.2. Unwanted Individuals 
Agency of some individualised techno-scientific and ecological entities may be presented as unwanted. 
For example, the phenomenon isolated by scientists as genetic erosion, defined as 'the loss of genetic 
diversity', is given the agency of reducing 'the short-term viability of individuals and populations, the 
evolutionary potential of populations and species and the direct use of genetic resources' (Mekbib 2008: 
352). Processes such as 'erratic weather patterns and increasing climate variability (Ingram et al. 2010)' 
may act to worsen the 'uncertainty of obtaining higher yields' (Scoones and Thompson 2011: 2). 
Similarly 'unpredictable weather patterns' may be given the agency of producing 'the erratic nature of 
agricultural input demand' (Odame and Muange 2011: 85). 
On Sub-Saharan farms, Gilbert (2012) argues that depleted soils produce an average stagnating yield of 
grain crops, 'at around one tonne per hectare since the 1960s (Gilbert 2012: 526). Using a statistical 
average to make a general claim about soils in SSA, Gilbert (2012) ends up obscuring all agro-ecological 
diversity within the region. Soils across SSA are homogenised and thus individualised.  
Insect pests are argued to work against 'efficient production of cereals in Africa, with lepidopteran 
stemborers, such as the indigenous Busseola fusca (Fuller), and the invasive Chilo partellus (Swinhoe) 
being the most important in most parts of Africa' (Khan et al. 2014: 334). These pests work as (negative) 
prime movers by attacking crops and causing yield losses. Similarly, leaf rust and stem rust, identified 
as diseases of wheat, and treated as individualised agents, are presented as producing important 
economic damage to cereals. Prominent among these was a Ugandan race of stem rust (Ug99) with a 
'broad virulence range', which is given the agency of overcoming most 'resistance genes' in wheat 
(Hodson 2011: 97). Similarly, yellow rust as pathogen is presented as possessing the ability to 'adapt 
and acquire new traits that give it a competitive advantage' (ibid.: 104). Yellow rust is depicted as an 
'exotic incursion', most likely from Europe into Australia, and blamed for producing 'significant 
production losses' (Hodson 2011: 96). Globalisation is made responsible for many 'exotic incursions'. 
Resulting 'stem rust epidemics' then serve as the 'driving force' in the development of rust control and 
mitigation efforts (Hodson 2011: 94). In this way, stem rust and its epidemics are treated as prime 
movers, for and against which other forces work. Globalisation manifests as a subsidiary force, working 
for the rusts by facilitating exotic incursions. Resistance against rust is inserted into semi-dwarf varieties 
of seeds by scientists such as Norman Borlaug. National and international mitigation efforts are enacted 
against rusts, and presented as if stem rusts provided the sufficient conditions required for these efforts 
to emerge. Thus, multiple local, national and global agencies are presented as subsidiary, reacting to 
the stem rusts. Yet farmers are largely missing from the picture. They do not even seem to have the 
reactive subsidiary agency, working for or against the stem rusts. 
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Individualising the agency of farmers, it may be depicted as detrimental (to the farmers themselves and 
for market or value chain development in African agriculture), producing unwanted effects. Some 
examples include the figuration of individualising agency of a (woman) farmer, named Catherine: the 
effect produced by her farming action is undesirable, in the form of a failing crop (Gilbert 2002).  
Farmers' attempts at organising themselves to 'achieve economies of scale' are considered ineffective 
(Toeniessen et al. 2008: 238). As a result, they are unable to drive down transaction costs to improve 
access in farm-input and capital markets. This generalisation about farmers' ineffectiveness is claimed 
to apply to 'most rural areas' (ibid.). The ineffective individual farmer is thus made representative of the 
majority of farmers in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
Rural communities isolated from their surroundings (individualised) are brought into the picture as 
weak, lacking 'a common voice and resources needed to hold local [development] organisations to 
account' (Ndiame et al. 2016: 200). Southern African farmers' continuous cultivation practices are 
argued to reduce soil fertility (Rowntree and Fox 2008: 42). Thus, when the agency of farmers is actually 
accounted for, it is often presented as homogeneously ineffective and problematic. Representations of 
farmers' agency are thus essentialising. 
3.2.3. Individualising Use 
The production of technology’s effects may be centered on the individualized process of its use, or 
practice. For example, increased fertilizer use may produce “bountiful harvests” and nearly triple maize 
yields (Gilbert 2012: 527). Fertilization is also given the agency of decreasing the “diversity of plant 
communities” (Wood et al. 2015: 745). Similarly, “high rates of N fertilizer use in agroecosystems” are 
attributed the agency of causing some environmental damage in the form of “increased concentrations 
of nitrate (NO3) in ground and surface waters” and “increased soil emissions of nitrous oxide” (Tully et 
al. 2016: 1907-8). And practices of the “more intensive management” type, associated with GR 
technologies of the 1960s, are presented as having “transformed wheat production systems” (Hodson 
2011: 95).  
Individualizing figurations may be given to structural forces such as the ‘tradition’ underpinning some 
farmers’ practices. Consider for example, the homogenisation of farmers’ pre-GR “non-intensive 
management practices” which do not produce crops, but rather under which “traditional wheat cultivars 
with long growth cycles were grown” (Hodson 2011: 94, emphasis added). Tradition appears to rule the 
roost here. Yet these ‘traditional wheat cultivars’ and pre-GR practices, as depicted by Hodson, were 
not adaptive or innovative. Nor was it heterogeneous. Tradition was thus essentialised. 
More favourable depictions of farmers’ traditional practice of “diversified farming” consider it adaptive 
and useful for “spreading risk in uncertain weather conditions as well as to meet dietary needs” (Brooks 
2014: 22). Brooks also recognizes that “farmers rely on informal seed systems to provide locally adapted 
varieties” (2013: 23; similar claim made by Odame and Muange 2011: 87). Thus, structures such as 
traditional practices and informal seeds systems are not considered static but as evolving over time in 
providing “locally adapted varieties”. This evolution takes place “through intergenerational transfer of 
knowledge and expertise and traditions of reciprocity and mutual support” (Brooks 2014: 22).  
3.2.4. Individualising Organisation 
The importance of actions by a range of individualised non-state organisations is widely recognised in 
the literature on East African GR. These include NGOs, private corporations that develop and market 
farm-inputs, and agro-dealers. Prominent among non-state organisations are donors such as the 
Rockefeller and Gates Foundations (Toeniessen et al. 2008). The Rockefeller Foundation, for example, 
is given the agency to 'build the national and international research resources necessary to generate 
and disseminate agricultural interventions that can increase the productivity, profitability, and 
sustainability of small-scale farms in developing countries' (Toeniessen et al. 2008: 235). It experiments 
with subsidies that are 'market smart'. In turn such subsidies 'stimulate demand for fertilizer and seed 
from private markets by providing farmers with targeted vouchers redeemable at local shops to help 
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cover the cost of specific inputs' (Toeniessen et al. 2008: 237). The Rockefeller Foundation is thus 
depicted as a prime mover, for which other agencies play subsidiary roles.  
The new green revolution in Kenya is promoted by the AGRA, which is supported by the Rockefeller 
Foundation and Gates Foundations. AGRA is given the agency of establishing its Agro-dealer 
Development Programme and investing millions of dollars into it (Odame and Muange 2011).3 AGRA, 
individualised, sets its own goals and operationalises its mandate by providing funding and technological 
assistance across the agricultural value chain (Ndiame et al. 2016).  
Other international organisations such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) are given the 
agency to promote agricultural solutions such as 'greener, cheaper' alternatives to inorganic fertilizers 
(Gilbert 2012: 525). Similarly, CGIAR4  organisations such as the International Food Policy Research 
Institute (IFPRI) make predictions about Africa remaining a ' "troubled region" in terms of imbalance 
between food demand and supply' (Toeniessen et al. 2008: 234). Nationally, the Kenya Agricultural 
Research Institute (KARI) given the individualising agency of redirecting 'some of its wheat research 
efforts to address the problems faced by smallholders' (Makanda and Oehmke 2007: 42). 
Some local development organisations, argued to be overly focused on their own survival, are given the 
agency of maintaining the status quo (as far as poverty is concerned), in order to continue using 'the 
plight of the poor to ensure a never-ending stream of funding from donors' (Ndiame et al. 2016: 201).5  
3.2.5. Decision-making and Implementing Agencies 
Farmers as a unified group may be individualised and given the agency to make decisions about resource 
use on their lands (Rowntree and Fox 2008). This recognition of farmers' decision-making agency is used 
to call for 'effective policies that sustain land productivity', which are based on development 
practitioners' empathy with the farmers (Rowntree and Fox 2008: 40). Resource-poor farmers in Kenya, 
unified as a group, are presented as agents who make choices, of buying 'small quantities of certified 
seeds' from agro-dealers, while mainly using seeds sourced from their informal networks (Odame and 
Muange 2011: 85). Farmers may decide not to grow a variety when it does not perform well 'for yield 
and resistance against various biotic and abiotic stresses' (Mekbib 2008: 354).  In addition to making 
decisions and choices, farmers may figure as perceivers of phenomena such as genetic erosion in the 
form of 'loss of variety' on the farm (Mekbib 2008: 354). 
Farmers as a unified homogenous group may be presented as implementers of 'the grand plans of 
scientists, international donors and governments' to improve soil fertility (Gilbert 2012: 525). It is 
recognised, however, that this agency may unfold differently depending on the plans being pushed. For 
instance, in the case of labour-intensive practices such as no-till farming, farmers may be depicted as 
slow adopters (ibid.).  
Differences among farmers may be recognised when Ugandan women farmers are presented as 
achieving lower yields than men (Kijima et al. 2006: 265), while acknowledging that it is not clear why 
the authors' analysis has revealed this 'result'. Similarly, Matsumoto and Yamano’s (2013: 209) 
regression results indicate that, while the education level of men in a household is associated with the 
adoption of High Yielding Varieties (HYVs) of seeds, 'the education level of women in the household in 
Uganda has a negative association with the HYV adoption'. The reasons, again, for this 'unexpected 
                                                          
3 Not quite a non-state organisation, the Washington Consensus structural adjustment programs are attributed the agency of 
producing a decline in fertilizer use in Africa (Nziguheba et al. 2010: 77). 
4 Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research 
5 The agency, to enhance the credibility of local non-state organisations, is given to 'well-written reports' (Ndiame et al. 2016: 
200). The reports also supposedly encouraged donors to provide more resources to the organisations. 
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result' are unclear. In these figurations, farmers are not presented as homogeneous, as gender 
differences are acknowledged. Yet the acknowledged difference is rather problematic, as women 
farmers are considered to be lagging behind male farmers (for unspecified reasons). Women farmers as 
a sub-group are also homogenised. 
Arguably the most important figurations of individualising agencies are given to African governments 
and policy. In these figurations, the state is often the prime mover (sometimes with relational 
constraints), with other agencies playing subsidiary roles. The Government, in Uganda, develops grand 
strategies to achieve their 'overarching development goals of poverty and food insecurity reduction' 
(Kijima et al. 2006: 252). It resettles people into villages across East Africa supposedly to promote 
agricultural improvement (Belshaw 1984; Fleming 1975). In Kenya, the Government built a public sector 
to develop and disseminate new technologies during the 1970s and 80s (Odame and Muange 2011: 79). 
It carries out market reform (Brooks 2014). Many governments in Africa align with international donors 
and scientists to promote agricultural technologies such as 'large doses of inorganic fertilizers” (Gilbert 
2012: 525). The Kenyan Government collaborates with non-governmental organisations (Goldberger 
2008). It also spearheads 'strategies for a new Green Revolution [in Kenya]' (Odame and Muange 2011: 
78). As part of these strategies, 'modern farming inputs and technologies' are generated, promoted and 
used (ibid.). The agro-dealers who distribute these inputs play a subsidiary role to government 
strategies.   
The state is given the credit of producing the so-called 'Malawi miracle' (Gilbert 2012: 526), by 
subsidising fertilizers and improved seeds. The miracle, 'according to government figures', involved a 
near tripling of maize yields between 2005 and 2009 as fertilizer use was almost doubled. In this sense, 
the agency of doubling yields in Malawi is pluralised, distributed between the state and the technologies 
it subsidises.6 Yet the technologies play subsidiary roles to the state’s prime mover. 
Brooks (2014) corroborates this Malawian success story. She also gives credit to Malawi’s 'input subsidy 
programme', which has led to surplus production of maize, while also functioning as a 'social protection 
mechanism that has reduced the need for food aid' (Brooks 2014: 19). A similar mechanism in other 
parts of SSA, in the form of a 'robust stimulus to agriculture' is ascribed the agency to trigger 'growth in 
non-farm sectors' and generate 'rural purchasing power for goods and services' (Jayne et al. 2003: 272).  
Often the agency of success or failure of programmes for agricultural intensification and diversification 
may be centred on the government. The latter is then treated as the prime mover. Government policy 
is made responsible for 'realising a Green Revolution in Africa' to enhance food security and to raise 
farmers' incomes (Otsuka and Yamano 2006: 397). Similarly government policy, and public sector 
investment for developing labour and service markets, is treated as a 'key determinant of the magnitude 
of the [nonfarm] growth linkages to be derived from agricultural growth' (Jayne et al. 2003: 273). 
Nonfarm employees and farmers act as subsidiaries, in responding to incentives provided by the state 
to seek nonfarm employment (Jayne et al. 2003; Otsuka and Yamano 2006), to intensify agricultural 
production (Belshaw 1984; Kijima et al. 2006; Toeniessen et al. 2008),7 or to diversify crops for climate 
adaptation (Brooks 2014).  
In Kenya, the British Colonial Government set up price supports for European colonial settler-farmers, 
slapped tariffs on imports and restricted 'the marketing of produce grown by Africans' (Makanda and 
Oehmke 2007: 35). The same government also set up research institutions 'after World War II to 
                                                          
6  If the state of affairs being transformed here is maize yield, this may viewed as a figuration of relational agency: the 
government (with its subsidy programme) is afforded by fertilizers and improved seeds. 
7 Brooks (2013) rightly criticises some official discourses that reduce farmers' (subsidiary) agency, in agricultural intensification, 
to 'consumer choice' of agricultural technologies. Such consumerisation of farmers leads, for instance, to a disregard of agro-
biodiversity issues and a range of other social and technical challenges faced on the farm. 
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strengthen agriculture in East Africa' (ibid.: 36). Individualised colonial government policy resettled local 
people in 'emergency villages' (Fleming 1975: 50). Promoting agrarian settlement (of land), the policy’s 
passive objects were the people who were resettled.8 The individualised land title assumed the agency 
of putting an end to insecurity of tenure under 'customary law'. It also supposedly gave 'the poorest 
smallholder access to credit' and provided the foundation for increasing agricultural productivity in 
colonial Kenya (Fleming 1975: 57). 
The government as a prime mover resettled people on land considered under-utilised. Farmers who 
were (forcibly) resettled played a subsidiary role by working as desired to raise agricultural production 
(Fleming 1975; Belshaw 1984).9 When the resettled people were presented as opposing or leaving the 
settlements, their agency was used to reaffirm faith in the state's narrowly rational planning: people 
were considered wrongheaded and their opposition situated in a background of widespread 'political 
agitation' in Kenya (Fleming 1975: 50). Or they were considered archaic, led by 'those with an interest 
in maintaining the existing system' (Fleming 1975: 47). People’s reasons for leaving the settlements 
were also reduced to debt or the lack of savings from settled agrarian production (Belshaw 1984). In 
this way, then, the settled agriculturalists' agency was situated for or against the state with its rational 
planning as the prime mover.  
The Colonial Government in Kenya is presented as the rational prime mover that decided against 
allotting more land to the Kikuyu, opting instead for intensification to 'improve the methods of farming 
on the land already allocated to the tribe' (Fleming 1975: 50). Note how this depiction is underpinned 
by the assumption that the colonised Kikuyu were not using lands effectively and their cultivation 
methods needed improving. This is a case of disqualification of the practices of the colonised farmers 
(Arora 2017), rather than simply giving them subsidiary roles. 
Moving into post-colonial Kenya, Kikuyu farmers are depicted as playing similar subsidiary roles. They 
are presented as initially unenthusiastic toward the Government’s land consolidation programme. But 
they 'co-operated in the process', according to Fleming (1975: 51), as soon as they 'saw the advantages 
to be derived from this process'. In the end, the programme 'spread rapidly throughout the Kikuyu area'. 
Noticing the success, it appears that other tribes demanded the same process to be applied in their 
areas. Here, Fleming (1975) unifies and homogenises not only the Kikuyu but the other tribes in Kenya 
too. Critically however, this unification is restricted to the Kikuyu's subsidiary agency in favour of the 
government. Differences within the Kikuyu are clearly acknowledged when they act against the 
government, their oppositional agitation is argued to be limited to 'some sections of the tribe (Fleming 
1975: 51). 
3.3. Figurations of Relational Agency 
Contrary to the expressions of faith in the agency of the state and its rational planning, developing 
country governments' agency may sometimes be presented as weak. This weakness may manifest in 
the form of 'the state's inability to meet the basic needs of the majority of the Kenyan population', due 
to the 'structural adjustment programs imposed by the International Monetary Fund' (Goldberger 2008: 
276). The same structural adjustment programs force a transition from the state's focus on land 
(reforms) to markets, promoting 'privatization of government agencies, liberalisation of markets, 
                                                          
8 In fact, the state was given the agency to remove people as it pleased, and at low 'net cost' if it was strong enough (Belshaw 
1984: 273). Similarly forests, unified and homogenised, were treated as passive objects that could be relocated by state policy 
'from high rainfall areas to less favourable ecological zones such as semi-arid areas' (Belshaw 1984: 274). 
9 It is interesting to compare the figuration of passive agency given to the farmers here with that of a 'pioneer [male] farmer' 
named Lord Delamare who 'began commercial production of wheat' in 1904, colonial Kenya (Makanda and Oehmke 2007: 
35). Delamare was a hero, the prime mover of one section of the narrative. He helped set up the British East Africa Maize 
Growers Association, hired a wheat breeder named G.W. Evans and established a 'wheat experimentation centre in Njoro, 
120 miles west of Nairobi (ibid.).  
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removal of government from agricultural markets, and elimination of subsidies' (Toeniessen et al. 2008: 
238).  
States, supported by donors, favour 'private sector actors and mechanisms' for the promotion of GR 
technologies such as fertilisers and other farm-inputs in Kenya (Brooks 2014: 19). However, this reform, 
it is argued, only furthers the agency of those larger companies that can absorb high transaction costs 
in procuring and delivering the subsidised technologies, which leads to market concentration. Similarly, 
Odame and Muange (2011: 79) present the Kenyan Government’s agency of being 'actively involved in 
input provision'. In this, the Government is presented as receiving backing from the AGRA, the FAO and 
The World Bank.  
In these figurations, the state's agency relationally afforded by donors and constrained by structural 
adjustment programs, but also the agency of large private firms, is afforded by the state through its 
privatisation policies. Figurations of relational agency focus on the identification of constraints, and the 
mutual alignment or affordance between disparate actors. I begin with some examples of the latter. 
3.3.1. Aligning Relational Agencies 
Odame and Muange (2011: 86) attribute prime mover status to a powerful network formed by an 
alliance between philanthropic, state and NGOs, which combine 'substantial external funding' with 
'local elite interests' to dominate the agricultural policy agenda in Kenya. Similarly affording each other, 
the 'new wave of sustainable development and the reality of World Trade Organization (WTO) have led 
to new quality trends in commodity sector', which further the imposition of environmental quality 
criteria on countries that produce the commodities (Philippe et al. 2009: 526). Another example of 
mutually aligning relational agency lies in the depiction of participatory interventions, where 
development administrators work with communities to assess 'potential interventions for the local 
situations' (Nziguheba et al. 2010: 78). Participatory agency may also be taken into account through 
collaborative research interventions (Khan et al. 2014: 335-336). For example, a range of institutions 
including International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT), the University of 
Nairobi and KARI collaboratively develop and release early-maturing varieties of pigeonpea (Simtowe 
and Muange 2013: 163). 
Mutually aligning fertilizer use and 'legume rotation practices' are given the credit of significantly 
increasing crop yields (Wood et al. 2015: 749). The role of farmers in these actions are made explicit by 
Wood et al. (2015: 745). In order to perform legume rotation, it is farmers who 'replace short-rain maize 
crops with fast-growing leguminous tree, shrub or herbaceous species'. The same combination, of 
fertilizer use and legume rotation practices, was also attributed the figuration of failed agency for 
another state of affairs, by not improving 'measures of soil quality, such as total soil C' (Wood et al. 
2015: 750).  
In many figurations of plural agencies acting in concert, relations between them are not made explicit. 
For example, depleted soils, scarce water supply, pests and diseases (leading to crop losses), poor 
infrastructures, 'use of traditional crop varieties', and 'inequitable land-distribution patterns' join 
together to produce 'low farm productivity in Africa' (Toeniessen et al. 2008: 233). Conversely, the 
agency to steadily increase 'per capita staple food crop production' in most developing countries may 
be attributed to different green revolution technologies, including high yielding varieties, pest control, 
irrigation, fertilizers and mechanisation (Nziguheba et al. 2010: 76). The millennium villages' project 
(MVP) package of agricultural interventions focussed on mineral fertilizers and improved seeds given 
the agency of doubling maize yields (Nziguheba et al. 2010: 92). The MVP package is also presented as 
the prime mover in this narrative. Farmers enter as subsidiary actors who adopt technologies and learn, 
all in reference to the prime mover. 
Technologies may also sometimes be ascribed the relational agency to produce harmful effects.  
Fertilizer use is presented as possibly leading to burning of young maize plants, 'in plots receiving high 
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doses of fertilizer, because low rainfall left fertilizer undiluted long enough to damage plant roots' (Tully 
et al. 2016: 1917). Plural technologies combined in 'intensive agriculture' figure as causing 
'environmental damage, such as water pollution and greenhouse gas emissions', while driving 'increases 
in crop production' (Wood et al. 2015: 744). Intensification also alters 'the composition of soil microbial 
communities' (ibid.).  
Based on statistical analysis, Mekbib (2008: 355) identifies a number of factors that cause genetic 
erosion in Sorghum (in Ethiopia). These include drought, falling farm size, reduced yields from some 
varieties (leading to their discontinuation), and the rise of other crops such as Khat and maize. In this 
way, the agency to produce genetic erosion is pluralised, yet relations between these plural agencies 
are not made explicit.  
The mutual affordance between fertilizers and soil organic matter is explicitly accounted for, as part of 
an integrated soil fertility management (ISFM) strategy (Toeniessen et al. 2008: 237). In ISFM, fertilizers 
greatly increase 'the production of organic matter', while 'organic matter in the soil improves its water-
holding capacity and increases the efficiency of fertilizer use by crops' (Toeniessen et al. 2008: 237-238). 
Similarly, the agency to produce variation in soil Nitrogen pool is ascribed to soil texture (e.g., clayey or 
sandy), which is in turn afforded by 'farm management' (Tully et al. 2016: 1917). Here, Tully et al. (2016: 
1917) are arguing that fertilizers' agency is mediated by both soil type and climate, which 'will combine 
to create very different outcomes for both farm productivity and N cycling across the [Sub-Saharan 
African] region'.10  
Afforded by other entities, even small farmers are depicted as able to act to extricate themselves from 
'traditional' attachments and to make money. A farmer, depicted as a 'he', breaks 'away from tribal 
restraints in measure', after realising the benefits that he can 'achieve through the application of 
advanced technology' (Fleming 1975: 48). Similarly, Toeniessen et al. (2008: 236) show farmers as 
responsible for obtaining 'higher and more stable yields'. Yet this agency is relationally afforded by 
'enhanced soil productivity combined with more resilient crop varieties' (Toeniessen et al. 2008: 236). 
And farmers' agency to increase farm profits is enabled by the 'presence of fairer and more efficient 
markets' (ibid.). The agency of African farmers as a group is afforded by their land (which is argued to 
be 'adequate to provide food security') and by intensification of production through a combination of 
'genetic and agroecological techniques that require only small amounts of additional labour and capital' 
as well as by 'greater access to markets' (Toeniessen et al. 2008: 235). Here farmers' agency to act in 
the new GR programmes is explicitly contingent on their land, capital, labour, technology (e.g., 'resilient 
crop varieties') and better market access. 
Figurations of relational agency are given to women farmers too. Beyadi, in southern Malawi, who also 
works as a schoolteacher, tends to her bountiful maize gardens to help 'feed her family of six' (Gilbert 
2012: 525).11 The author states explicitly that Beyadi’s successful maize farming is not just down to her 
own efforts. Her success, according to Gilbert (2012: 525), 'is also due to what she feeds the soil. Beyadi 
borrowed money from a European friend to purchase two 50-kilogram bags of chemical fertilizer for 
this growing season'. Relational affordances, both technological (chemical fertilizers) and social (money-
                                                          
10 This raises the important question whether hybrid (social-ecological-technical) figurations of relational agency, by being 
attentive to the different ways in which humans and nonhumans interact on the farm and beyond, are better able to do 
justice to the agro-ecological diversity in regions such as SSA. 
11 Compare Beyadi’s agency with that of her neighbour Catherine, 'an unmarried mother of four'. Where Beyadi’s maize 'stands 
tall even in the lashing rain', the maize on her neighbour's field is yellowed and bows low (Gilbert 2012: 525). Beyadi's taller 
moral standing is thus presented as playing a supportive role in furthering her agency as a successful farmer with tall maize 
standing in her fields.  
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lending European friend), of the successful and progressive woman farmer's agency are thus clearly 
brought into the picture. 
On the flip side, in new GR programmes 'farmers are incentivised to devote more land and other 
resources to maize cultivation', which discourages them from their traditional practice of diversification, 
inducing 'higher levels of maize dependence' and vulnerability (Brooks 2014: 22). Outside GR 
programmes, in instances of formally sponsored organic agriculture, farmers' agency is relationally 
afforded by training received from NGOs, in performing meticulous practices after receiving training 
from technical experts (Goldberger 2008: 285). Women farmers, in particular, felt empowered by 
possessing detailed knowledge of organic agriculture. 
3.3.2. Manifesting Agencies 
Farmers may be ascribed the agency of learning. Yet this agency is often latent, until made manifest by 
their encounters with new technology such as New Rice for Africa (NERICA) in Uganda (Kijima et al. 
2006). As active learners, farmers are able to achieve higher yields, especially if they have past 
cultivation experience with the same crop. The new technology is the prime mover in the narrative, 
which more than doubles crop yields. Farmers, as learners and even if they are experienced, play 
(successful) subsidiary roles.12 Other subsidiary actors taken into account include, soil fertility, relatively 
high rainfall, and some application of fertilisers (Kijima et al. 2006: 266).  
Farmers are given the agency of practicing 'non-certified organic farming', especially in regions that are 
'resource-poor or agriculturally marginal': this agency is made manifest by constraints posed by 
resource poverty and marginality, due to which they 'have no choice but to rely on locally available 
natural resources to maintain soil fertility and to combat pests and diseases' (Goldberger 2008: 275).  
Farmers' agency, of having successfully achieved 'optimal nitrogen application level' in Kenya, is brought 
to the fore by market forces such as 'relative price change over time' (Matsumoto and Yamano 2013: 
218). Having afforded precedence to market forces, this recognition of farmers' relational agency is then 
used to claim that 'a market-based approach, such as reducing the inorganic fertilizer price or increasing 
the maize price or both, would be effective in encouraging farmers to use more inorganic fertilizer in 
Kenya' (Matsumoto and Yamano 2013: 217). Here farmers' agency, by reacting to prices, is considered 
as subsidiary to the prime mover of a market-based approach. 
Households' and communities' agency, in the form of adaptive capacity, is considered latent until made 
manifest by crises such as famines. People act by carrying out farm-based adaptation and migration that 
includes moving to areas where 'famine crops' such as Cassava can be grown (Brooks 2014). Households' 
and communities' agency here is, in a specific way, relationally afforded by the constraint of a crisis.  
3.3.3. Constraining Agencies 
Farmers' agency to achieve high yields argued to be relationally constrained by 'the profitability of the 
crop and the farmers’ ability to save and reinvest in agricultural inputs or other income generating 
activities' (Nziguheba et al. 2010: 91). Beyond farmers and their communities, relational constraints may 
be recognised on the agency of agro-dealers (e.g., in Kenya) in 'providing inputs and information to 
producers and hence delivering the Green Revolution' (Odame and Muange 2011: 85). These constraints 
include 'weaknesses in the regulatory framework' and the agro-dealers' lack of working capital to 
adequately stock or expand their businesses' (ibid.).   
Local and national organic agriculture NGOs in Kenya bring different actors together around 'common 
objectives, such as promoting a sustainable agricultural alternative to the Green Revolution' 
                                                          
12 This representation of farmers is confirmed when Kijima et al. (2006) depict them as lacking knowledge and learning 
capabilities outside the triggering zone of modern technologies, e.g., for sustainable soil management. 
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(Goldberger 2008: 272). In this process, the NGOs are depicted as prime movers. 13  Other actors, 
including 'foreign donors, farmers, agricultural researchers, and the Kenyan state', act as subsidiaries by 
allowing themselves to be rallied behind a common goal by the NGOs (Goldberger 2008: 272). The same 
organic NGOs also act as prime movers in extending the boundaries of formal agricultural science, 
through the inclusion of 'indigenous farming knowledge/practice that had been previously decreed by 
GR pioneers as "traditional and thus not scientific" ' (Goldberger 2008: 272). In this process, scientists 
play a subsidiary role by including the indigenous knowledge and farmers by letting their knowledge be 
included by scientists. Farmers allow themselves to be given a voice by the NGOs (Goldberger 2008: 
278). 
Despite being presented as prime movers, relational constraints and affordances of the NGOs' agency 
are readily recognised by Goldberger (2008). The constraints might come from donors who make 
unrealistic demands and to whom the NGOs are accountable. They may also come from the NGOs' own 
local constituents who have high expectations (Goldberger 2008). Affordances are provided by [linkages 
with] extension services, research institutes and universities, as well as donors. 
Agency of political processes, constituted relationally by 'power dynamics and contested politics', is 
taken into account. These processes are argued to underpin the win-win narratives of a new Green 
Revolution in Africa. They define as legitimate some particular pathways for the future, while at the 
same time constraining the development of many others. 
The technological focus of breeding efforts [is] on certain key crops and varieties through 
particular breeding or genetic engineering techniques, which means that other ‘orphan’ crops 
or alternative breeding strategies get short shrift, with limited funds, low prestige and 
inadequate R&D. 
(Scoones and Thompson 2011: 16). 
Constraints may also be acknowledged on the successful agency of modern technologies such as hybrid 
seeds. For example, Philippe et al.’s (2009: 534) attribute the agency of producing 'substantial expected 
genetic progress for yield' to 'multi-trait selection in a hybrid population'. They then acknowledge that 
selection for higher yield was difficult without reducing fertility, because 'selection for productivity and 
fertility were opposite (ibid.). Here, the constraint that is made explicit relates to the technology 
development process. The figuration of relational agency of technology thus excludes agro-ecological 
and climatic factors influencing the yield-increasing potential of newly developed seeds.  
For an African GR, it is recognised that processes (including agro-ecological ones), such as erratic rainfall, 
lack of soil nutrients and poor infrastructure of roads and railroads, place limits on the effectiveness of 
the higher-yielding varieties developed by international research centers (Toeniessen et al. 2008: 235).  
Figurations of successful relational agency include 'green solutions' such as 'nitrogen-fixing legumes' 
and 'fertilizer trees' (Gilbert 2012: 526-527). In their efforts to 'capture nitrogen from the atmosphere', 
the legumes (e.g., pigeonpea and soya beans) are relationally afforded by 'bacteria in their roots' 
(Gilbert 2012: 526). Farmers' agency in this narrative is restricted to the planting of the 'legumes next 
to grain crops'. Other green solutions such as organic manure (derived from livestock), similarly isolated 
from farmers’ practices, and are given the agency of increasing long-term fertility (Rowntree and Fox 
2008). 
Figurations of technology's agency as relationally constrained may also be used to appreciate 
technology's poor results. For example, 'external fertilizers' are given the agency of producing 'low 
returns on degraded soils' (Matsumoto and Yamano 2013: 198, emphasis added). In turn the low returns 
                                                          
13 Interestingly, when made explicit by Goldberger (2008), the NGOs are led by male rather than female directors. 
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is presented as forcing 'farmers to reduce the already low inorganic fertilizer application, which in turn 
may contribute to further land degradation' (ibid.). Here degraded soils and farmers act as constraints 
on the fertilizers' possibilities for producing effects that are considered desirable and positive. Similarly, 
low soil moisture is argued to constrain the fertilizers' agency of increasing productivity (Tully et al. 
2016). 
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4. Discussion and Conclusions 
In the foregoing, I have recounted a wide range of figurations of agency in the East African GR narratives 
as well as relations that afford and constrain agency. Yet, to a significant extent, what remains hidden 
are the actual ways in which the constraints and affordances on agency are negotiated in practice, 
particularly the practices carried out on the farm. So while it is clear that constraints and affordances 
on farmers' agency are posed by technologies, land and other resources, (erratic) weather patterns, 
(degraded) soils, government agencies, NGOs, agro-dealers, traditions and customs, how farmers adapt 
and adjust to the constraints and affordances are largely not articulated. Studies do invoke the term 
practices, of crop rotation (Wood et al. 2015), as well as 'proper agronomic practices' (Nziguheba et al. 
2010: 104), but how different social, ecological and technical entities adjust and adapt to each other in 
practice, how they become entangled with each other on and off the farm, is largely not discussed.  
The conclusions of this paper are in two parts with a final part on future directions. In the first, I discuss 
the performative implications of ascriptions of prime mover status to (individualised) agencies. This 
enables a discussion of how different figurations empower and disempower particular agencies, in 
relation to their performative effects. However, at the outset, I must clarify that multiple shifting 
figurations of prime movers are encountered across different sections and passages within a single GR 
study. So my conclusions in the following apply to specific figurations, which may recur across studies, 
but are not meant to be generally applicable to all East African GR studies. In the second, I discuss how 
power is associated with the (non-)representation of cultural difference within social groups, and of the 
difference between things as they are known and enacted in specific socio-ecological situations. Finally 
I present some directions for future research. 
4.1. Appropriation of Agency by (Individualised) Prime Movers and Commodification  
A critical aspect that is obscured in most studies is uncertainty about action. In particular, studies that 
attribute agency to individualised humans or nonhumans did not pause to wonder if this action might 
be mediated by other entities near and far. An appreciation of the involvement of mediators makes any 
attempt to capture and represent action uncertain (Latour 2005) in at least two ways. First, courses of 
actions, as one thing leads to another, may not be a priori determinable (Wynne 1992). Second, any 
prior facts and artefacts used in the narrative for supporting claims may themselves be uncertain and 
partial. Obscuring these uncertain aspects gives a sense of completeness (of having captured reality 
fully) to narratives, which would be lacking if their claims and statements were admitted to be uncertain. 
Undergirded by this sense of completeness, narratives assume the authority and legitimacy to inform 
policy and design development interventions, thereby enhancing the chances that they are 
performative.  
The obscuring of uncertainties also makes it easier to ascribe the status of successful prime movers to 
some agencies, especially those that are individualised. The usual suspects here are heroic individual 
scientists such as Borlaug, national governments and international donors.14 In agronomic narratives, 
they may also be individualised modern technologies. Such figurations empower their subjects in two 
ways. First, the figurations give credit to the prime mover for work that is actually carried out by a wide 
range of agencies including, especially, farmers and their lands. This appropriation of credit is 
performative: it serves as a justification for directing continued resources to the prime mover, be it a 
scientific institution, a national government or a technology (that may be subsidised). Conversely, by 
not giving equal credit to farmers' agency or to that of their lands, and often treating them as 
                                                          
14 Relational constraints/affordances on the prime movers are also recognised by many narratives, as mapped above. For 
example, post-colonial government as the prime mover may be presented to be constrained by international forces such as 
donors or by their own citizens. This was different from the unconstrained agency of British colonial government. 
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subsidiaries to the usual prime movers, these figurations potentially disempower farmers, by leading 
to: a) situations in which financial (and other) support reaches the farm only through a prime mover 
such as the national government or a modern technology; b) reductions in the flow of financial and 
other resources to the farmers; or c) lack of support for developing diverse and adaptive farm-based 
solutions rooted in farmers' collective learning abilities, in their informal networks for exchanging farm-
inputs, to sustain local agro-ecologies (Scoones and Thompson 2011; Brooks 2014). 
Second, these figurations may serve the purpose of legitimising large-scale techno-scientific 
interventions, for example under the rubric of the Green Revolution (GR), in East African agriculture. 
Such interventions may be spearheaded by the government and the heroic scientist. They may be 
supported by a powerful donor and centred on technologies marketed by large corporations. And they 
may be presented as controlling disease epidemics, eradicating hunger, reducing poverty and creating 
economic prosperity. In this way, the success stories not only legitimate the prime movers' actions but 
also help empower them further by informing government policies and strategies. As some of these 
prime movers (such as large agribusiness corporations) already hold disproportionate amounts of 
power in contemporary societies, such individualising prime mover figurations may further entrench 
the status quo of high income/wealth inequalities and unequal relations of (cultural-political) power.  
Beyond individualised technologies, scientists, governments and donors, prime mover figurations are 
given to market-based approaches (including prices, subsidies and other incentives, often tied to 
technologies such as chemical fertilizers). Closely aligned with these depictions are multiple forces that 
foster commodification of agriculture, including through the efforts to promote a new African Green 
Revolution in the last decade.15 These forces include donor funds; international agricultural research 
institutions; agricultural and development economists with their growth models and poverty indicators; 
various government departments, including national agricultural research systems; development NGOs 
helping implement poverty reduction or sustainable development goals; transnational corporations 
pushing farm-inputs and those hoarding commodities; national agribusinesses; local agro-dealers; large 
farmers and land-grabbing contractors; interlocking technologies in intensive agriculture; assumptions 
of availability of sufficient land in Africa; diverse ecological relations transformed into natural resources; 
value chains involving auditors and third party certifiers as well as super-retailers of food in the global 
north that sell the same fresh produce round the year. These forces of commodification do not form a 
single unified system that one can neatly delineate, and help replace, but rather a disparate and 
disorderly assemblage (of variously entangled social, ecological and technical forces) that transcends 
multiple scales, silos and disciplines. The wide reach and expansion of these forces of commodification 
may in fact be a product of their disparate and disorderly organisation in extensive assemblages. 
The effects produced by some (individualising and relational) prime movers may be negative. Examples 
of such prime movers include insect pests, plant diseases such as leaf and stem rust (and their 
epidemics), genetic erosion, depleted soils and rapid population growth. Yet the dramatic effects 
produced by most of these prime movers are used to create space for the promotion of techno-scientific 
solutions such as stem-resistant varieties, inorganic fertilizers, and integrated pest management. The 
figurations of negative prime movers thus serve a similar purpose as critique (as discussed in the sub-
section titled Malthusian and Critical Agencies). 
4.2. The Power of (Non-)Representation of Difference  
Beyond prime movers (and subsidiaries), power often figures in the East African GR studies in the form 
of homogenisation and atomisation of diverse people and things in action. Difference is obscured in this 
way and whole tribes and farmers in a region, country or across SSA, may be presented as acting in 
                                                          
15 Individualising agency on a technology gives the impression that the technology is effective by itself and once adopted it will 
lead to an improvement of agricultural productivity on every farm. Mass adoption of technology as a commodity (a fertilizer, 
a pesticide or a seed variety) then paves the way to growth in agriculture and beyond. 
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concert (often through a representative agent), for instance in following government and donor 
prescriptions to intensify agriculture.16 Ecological entities such as trees and soils may also be presented 
as undifferentiated, often across SSA (Gilbert 2012; Philippe et al. 2009). Homogenisation of entities 
that constitute a particular group (or category) may serve three performative effects. First, it aids mass 
commodification of a modern technology. If soils on all farms across Africa are depleted, and if that 
causes stagnating crop yields, then all farmers must adopt fertilizers to improve productivity. And 
governments and donors must make this happen through policy and other development interventions. 
Homogenisation helps (social) scientists provide general prescriptions for policy. If trees are always good 
for coffee farms, then a single policy for shaded cultivation can be designed and implemented across a 
country, region or the continent. 
Second, by marginalising heterogeneity within a group, homogenising depictions obscure unequal 
relations of power, and cultural and epistemological hierarchies within the group are thus occluded 
(Arora and Romijn 2012). Neither all (male and female) smallholders nor all Kikuyu tribe members are 
equally powerful decision makers. Neither are all, or even most, African soils (and lands) the same 
texture, nor all scientists able to take this agroecological diversity into account (compare for example 
Tully et al.’s 2016 concern with diversity and variation in SSA with Toeniessen et al.’s 2008 general claims 
about the continent). Homogenisation thus depoliticises complex social groups based on landholding, 
gender and expertise.  
When GR narratives do account for difference within a social group, it is important to consider how the 
difference is represented. Consider two depictions of gendered relations of power in the East African 
GR studies. First, Ugandan women farmers' agency is presented as weaker than their male counterparts, 
both for increasing rice yields and for HYV adoption (Matsumoto and Yamano 2013; Kijima et al. 2006). 
Both studies claim that reasons for this result are unclear. Second, a woman farmer in Malawi named 
Catherine figures as a bad farmer with 'stunted, yellowed stalks' in her maize field and she is 'an 
unmarried mother of four' (Gilbert 2012: 525). Unlike her progressive neighbouring farmer (also a 
woman) named Beyadi, who doubles as a school teacher, Catherine did not adopt chemical fertilizers. 
In this figuration, the author makes an association between Catherine’s poor performance as a 
'backward' farmer and her supposedly 'low' moral standing as an 'unmarried mother'. Both these 
depictions are clearly problematic. They highlight that difference must be tackled without naturalising 
hierarchy, without passing individualising moral judgments, and without essentialising sub-groups (and 
subcategories) such as 'progressive women farmers'.  
Third, homogenisation of entities belonging to the same category such as soils and fertilizers obscures 
the ontological multiplicity of things. Things not only manifest differently across different farms and 
regions, but are also enacted and known differently in a soil scientist's laboratory and in a farmer's field 
(see Mol (2002) on ontological multiplicity; for an agricultural analysis see Arora et al. 2013). This 
ontological multiplicity is, in general, not articulated in the GR studies analysed in this paper. Obscuring 
the ontological multiplicity of things may limit efforts to challenge and contravene extant hierarchies 
between different ways of knowing which situate 'modern' techno-scientific objects (knowledge, 
artefacts) as universally valid and effective. The same obscuring may also allow the developers and 
promoters of 'modern' objects to disqualify other 'vernacular' ways of knowing, including the multiple 
ways in which the modern artefacts may be adapted and adjusted on farms (Arora 2017). Recognising 
the ontological multiplicity of things may make it possible to appreciate the validity of divergent ways 
of producing and using knowledge and artefacts. A specific setting such as a laboratory may actualise 
only some aspects of an object of knowledge, while other aspects may be known in a farmer's field. 
Recognising this multiplicity may be critical for articulating and practising new terms of engagement 
                                                          
16 Yet internal heterogeneity within a group, such as the Kikuyu in Kenya, is made explicit when it comes to depicting opposition 
to the state. Resistance appears to be driven only by some members of the tribe, but acquiescence to the state is practised 
by all (Fleming 1975). 
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between different ways of knowing, which reconfigure epistemological and cultural hierarchies, and 
pave the way for democratic collaboration and divergent learning between scientists, planners, 
designers, extension agents, development administrators, farmers and workers (Arora 2017). 
4.3. Directions of Future Research on Agency and Power in Discourse 
Finally, some directions for future research on configurations of agency and power in discourse. First, it 
might be useful to extend the study to include policy documentation on agricultural intensification from 
the national governments as well as the East African Community. Comparisons between figurations of 
agency and power in policy documents and academic studies may also then yield further insights on the 
issues of difference, depoliticisation and disorder raised above. Similar comparisons may be carried out 
between studies focussed on different (Anglophone, Francophone and Lusophone) regions of Africa.  
Second, in addition to authors' academic disciplines, it might be interesting to explore questions of style. 
Does a critical style of presentation have to be underpinned by attributing negative agency to entities 
in order to create discursive space for preferred alternatives? How is a style in which (individualised) 
agency is presented as an attempt or trial or experiment, rather than as an achievement or 
responsibility, related to forces of commodification discussed above? How is the admitting of 
uncertainty in knowledge related to styles of articulation and presentation of results? Does an 
examination of styles of research reveal similarities and differences across scientific disciplines which 
defy conventional classifications between sciences considered soft and hard, natural and social/cultural, 
qualitative and quantitative, systematising and interpretive? Explorations into styles of inter- and multi-
disciplinary presentation might also yield insights into the dynamics of such research, particularly in 
terms of inclusion of inputs and insights from the more 'marginalised' disciplines in the collaboration. 
Ultimately, questions of style may enable detailed examination of how research presented as neutral 
may be political, through the entanglement of the studied worlds with researchers' moral values, 
beliefs, professional obligations, available equipment, persistent doubts and collective creativity as well 
as political-economic pressures and interests associated with the promotion of a green revolution which 
the researchers may be exposed to. 
Third, although rarely encountered in the East African GR studies, emotions and feelings may be given 
the agency to produce significant effects. For example, Pollock (2008) attributes agency to 'anxiety 
about food shortages' in driving the Rockefeller foundation to set up the Cooperative Wheat Research 
and Production Program in Mexico (where Borlaug was based). Figurations of agency given to affect 
may therefore be interesting to explore further.  
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